This essay analysis the crisis of the theory of legal sources in Brazilian contemporary law and its negative impact on the implementation of the Democratic and Social State and of Rule of Law. Without disregarding the perspective of guarantee of rights, in a Constitutional reading informed by the model of the Democratic and Social State, it is imperative to consider also the questions of democracy and the separation of powers in the light of the legal sources, which is possible by revaluing the role of legislation considered in a context of greater democratic legitimacy and created from a more effective dialogue with other legal sources.

En el presente ensayo se intenta reflexionar sobre la crisis en que se encuentra la teoría de las fuentes jurídicas en el derecho brasileño contemporáneo, y el impacto negativo sobre la efectiva concreción del Estado democrático y social. Sin desvalorizar la perspectiva de la garantía de derechos, en una lectura de la Constitución conformada por el modelo del Estado democrático de derecho, es fundamental considerar también las cuestiones de la democracia y de la separación de los poderes en la configuración de las fuentes jurídicas.

A Constituição de 1988 atribuiu substancial independência ao poder judiciário. Há garantias institucionais (autonomia financeira/administrativa e autogoverno), garantias funcionais (vitaliciedade, irredutibilidade salarial e inamovibilidade) e proteção à independência. De outro lado, apesar da substancial independência judicial, observavam-se antes da EC 45/2004 (reforma do judiciário e criação do CNJ) profundos déficits de accountability vertical judicial (possibilidade de os cidadãos controlarem e influenciarem as ações do judiciário) e accountability horizontal judicial (controle de juízes e tribunais por outros órgãos judiciários). O artigo analisa, a partir da definição e diferenciação do conceito de accountability judicial e do arranjo institucional posterior à EC 45/2004, como as competências do CNJ podem ser exercidas para ampliar os mecanismos de accountabilities e de controle do judiciário sem restringir a independência decisional judicial.

The 1988 Brazilian Federal Constitution granted substantial independence to the judiciary. There are institutional guarantees (financial and administrative autonomies / self-governance), functional guarantees (tenure, irremovability and irreducible salary) and protection of independence. On the other hand, despite the substantial judicial independence is observed before the Constitutional Amendment (EC) 45/2004 (judicial reform and creating of National Council of Justice - CNJ) deep deficits of vertical-judicial accountability (possibility for citizens to monitor and influence the actions of the judiciary) and horizontal-judicial accountability (judges and courts are controled by other judicial bodies). The paper analyzes, from the definition and differentiation of the concept of judicial accountability and institutional arrangement subsequent to EC 45/2004, as the powers of the CNJ may be exercised to extend the mechanisms of control and accountabilities of the judiciary without restricting the decisional judicial independence.